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INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR SINCE THE WAR
N all revolutionary periods customary law tends to suffer from
emotional attack and from the popular aemand for short cuts
to salvation. The function of law as a guaranty of general security,
as a source of reliance for the weak, as a necessary foundation for
enterprise and commitments, as an alternative to force, corrup-
tion, and favoritism, is forgotten in the hysterical exaltation of
panaceas, punitive methods, and radical departures from tried ex-
perience. This is usually accompanied by a deprecation of tradi-
tion and precedent as obstacles in the way of the new revelation.
These corollaries of all revolutionary movements are markedly
exemplified in the intellectual ferment pervading the field of inter-
national relations which finds expression in a worship of the sup-
posedly new methods of insuring peace by collective "enforce-
ment." Since the formation of the League of Nations, it has been
argued that any disturbance of the peace has become so serious a
problem that every nation had an interest in suppressing an out-
break, now characterized as an attack on all the members of the
family of nations. The organization set up was designed to prevent
such disturbance, but if any nation resorted to "war" to solve its
difficulties (except to enforce the peace treaties) the others would
convene to denounce it as an "aggressor" and take joint action to
bring it to heel. Thus, "aggressors" were either to be frightened
into remaining contented or at least restrained, or else, if they
broke loose and started shooting, all the other nations would, in
disgust or anger at such a breach of etiquette or covenant, sever all
trade relations with the "aggressor," enjoining abstention on their
respective nationals and even preventing "financial, commercial,
and personal intercourse" of the covenant-breaker with the na-
tionals of a state not a member of the League. Armed blockade and
more severe sanctions might follow. In addition, the territorial
integrity of all the members of the League was to be jointly guar-
anteed.
Why it should have been supposed that any such political scheme
could work in practice can only be conjectured. It may be ascribed
to a psychosis which not infrequently has been a concomitant and
aftermath of war. It had a special explanation in the present ease,
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because a great war had been fought on the postulate, widely propa-
gated and entertained, of a Holy Crusade, and the infidel having
been beaten and disarmed, the conception naturally arose that the
late constellation mirrored the general nature of war and pointed
the approved method of preserving peace. Philosophical minds
with an awareness of history and of human characteristics should
not have espoused it. Speaking of a similar scheme to "enforce
peace" proposed by the French government, a wise Frenchman,
Charles Dupuis, remarked that it was "precise, complete, logical,
chimerical, and impractical." The idea has not only failed of
realization, but it was certain to fail, because it was founded on a
defiance of the elementary facts of human nature and experience.
It can only be hoped that the chances for genuine peace through
reconciliation have not thereby become hopelessly mired. But even
had the idea been theoretically sustainable, rarely has the world,
particularly in Europe, been organized with less assurance of natural
stability encouraging its success. The result is that, in spite of all
the evangelical devotion accorded the "new ideal," the state of the
world has steadily deteriorated and armaments have prodigiously
increased, until now an unprecedentedly acute nationalism threatens
the resumption of hostilities on the grand scale. There is a reason
for this, and I venture to suggest that it is due in part (1) to the
failure to appreciate what has actually been going on in the world
of realities since 1919 and (2) to the disparagement of many time-
tested principles and processes of law, errors associated with the
nurture of the "new psychology." I would not be understood to
deprecate the administrative and non-political functions of the
League, or certainly its processes for discussion, conciliation, and
adjudication. Its Achilles' Heel lies in the plan and machinery
for "enforcing" by sanctions the peace of 1919.
It is perhaps not surprising that the world charted at Versailles
and its environs should have appealed to many as a universe justly
reconstructed. Its beneficiaries and those whose emotions were
domiciled at Versailles may well have believed that the world had
reached its ultimate territorial readjustment. The reading of such a
book as Nicholson's "Peace-Making" ought to puncture any such
illusion, but 1919 was not a time of cold objective consideration of
facts, There were represented at Versailles certain Powers which,
having arrogated to themselves all that was worth taking, naturally
desired to have an unchallenged and unchallengeable title to their
possessions and found it useful to enshroud their swollen fortunes
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INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR SINCE THE WAR
with a moral sanction. Any one who threatened those possessions
was not only a law-breaker but a moral pariah. Peace conferences
are not distinguished for their sense of humor. Peace as an ideal
and the status quo as a fact were thus indelibly welded. Emotional
morality was enlisted to support the new charter of Europe and
the world.
While it may have been assumed by some that article 19 of the
Covenant of the League, which contemplates possible changes in the
status quo, would be permitted to ameliorate some of the grosser
disequilibriums, it Was not likely that the vested interests created
at Versailles would easily admit diminution or modification. Events
have shown that the synthetic countries of Eastern Europe, which
did very little, if anything, to win their independence or territorial
accretions but which were conceived and evolved primarily to shift
the ancient balance of power, are perhaps the staunchest defenders
of the status quo and openly threaten war if it is changed. The
legal argument is advanced that article 19 is quite useless as a
source of revision, for it takes the unanimous vote of the Assembly
to authorize the consideration of treaties that have become inappli-
cable, and only reconsideration, and not revision, is possible under
the article. Thus, it is construed analogously to the Kellogg Pact,
which excludes all wars but "defensive" wars, each nation being
the exclusive judge of whether it is fighting in self-defense. Europe
has thus created a number of Frankensteins which threaten its
future, not only in human lives but as the center of western culture.
For the first time the world, with unparalleled instruments of de-
struction available, faces the ugly possibility of bringing western
civilization to its nadir by another international holocaust. It is
a little sardonic that the preservation of the newly created or swollen
states of Eastern Europe should invite this prospect, and it may
yet be hoped that the instinct of self-preservation will help the
present managers of the world's affairs to avert the great disaster.
Only a sensible revision of the 1919 treaties, and not too great a
revision, seems necessary. It would be lamentable if the western
world is inexorably bound to surrender before the impossibility of
such a task and is doomed to accept the alternative.
The preservation of the status quo, identified in Europe with
"peace," induced the movement for "sanctions." There was little
in human experience to suggest that it was possible to expect that
all the states would at any time join in coercing any other state
because the latter had not lived up to an obligation, actual or alleged.
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Speaking of so cohesive a group of states as those of the American
Union, Madison considered the notion of "coercive sanctions" as
"exploded on all hands," and Hamilton characterized it as "one
of the maddest projects ever devised." Yet this conception of an
international modus operandi appealed to many as practical; to
some of the European victors, because it reinsured their somewhat
unnatural political positions; to intellectuals in other parts of the
world, because it seemed to them a method of avoiding disturbances
of order. That little, if any, substitutes for war had been supplied to
effect those changes which life-a continuing process of growth and
decay-and time make necessary, had been too largely overlooked;
for the conciliation and arbitration provided in the Covenant, im-
portant as they are, do not enable many territorial or treaty changes
to be effected. Thus, a political system of unusual rigidity was
clamped upon the world, at a time when so many new arrangements
were projected that some were bound to prove experimental. The
refusal to permit of any readjustment, notwithstanding the demon-
strated inappropriateness and danger of many of these arrange-
ments, has poisoned the atmosphere of Europe until numerous
peoples are ready to fly at each other's throats in sheer desperation.
E. D. Morel, a wise and constructive statesman, characterized, in a
celebrated pamphlet, the Treaty of Versailles as "the poison that
destroys." These peoples are restrained mainly by poverty, by the
realization on the part of the disinherited that the effort would
probably now be unsuccessful, and by other considerations of ex-
pediency. The will to peace, the spirit which makes for peace,
which should have been cultivated in the crucible of reconciliation
and appeasement, has been overwhelmed in the conflicts engendered
on the one hand by the determination to hold down the status quo
unalterably, and on the other hand by a refusal to accept it as
permanent. The treaties of 1919 were therefore not inspired by a
desire for reconciliation, which Kant indicated as the essential
premise of a durable peace treaty, but contemplated rather the con-
tinuation of the war in other forms. Europe therefore lives in a
continued state of hatred and uneasiness which makes hope of
durable peace unsubstantial. Under these circumstances it was
not to be expected that the promises of the Treaty for Allied dis-
armament, following that of the Central Powers, would be observed,
and the world must now await the consequences of that breach.
If only a temporary agreement for theoretical equality between
France and Germany could be worked out, time could perhaps be
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gained for rectifying by diplomacy some of the major mistakes of
the past fifteen years.
It is perhaps unnecessary to dwell further on the facts of European
political relations to realize why the "new psychology" or "new
spirit," professedly discovered by certain writers, seems a figment
of the imagination and why the "new system" of enforcing peace
by collective sanctions has broken down. Even if the nations could
agree upon an "aggressor"--always a political and hardly a legal
conception, and hardly a suitable framework to enclose deep-seated
historical, psychological, and political sources of grievance-it was
not to be expected that any government could persuade its people
to launch upon sanctions or war with a foreign nation when its vital
interests were not engaged. Only some of the Powers would as a
rule be in a position to apply sanctions, and the costs and risks of
such an enterprise would hardly be incurred unless profound na-
tional interests were at stake. This became even more apparent as
nationalism and the struggle for economic survival were intensified.
The growing dissatisfaction of the masses made it seem ever more
unlikely that any government would readily become an instrument
of coercion of other states in an assumed collective interest. The
action of the British Government, in February, 1933, in placing an
embargo on arms shipments to both China and Japan and insisting
on the preservation of British neutrality in that struggle, immedi-
ately after the League Assembly had adopted a resolution condemn-
ing Japan, should be illuminating. The same reluctance to under-
take sanctions, not now even suggested, is evident in the Chaco.
The British action was perhaps typical of what every government
seeking to avoid war is likely to do; for we must face the paradox
that the enforcement of peace by sanctions, collective or other-
wise, risks and often invites war. To accomplish peace through
war promises no improvement in the world's affairs. Against
smaller Powers, sanctions such as a display of force, withdrawal
of diplomatic representatives, withholding of recognition, and even
landing troops have occasionally been employed by interested na-
tions; and while unilateral sanctions are to be deplored and may
well be mitigated by strengthening the processes for conciliation
and adjudication, the complicated "peace machinery" was not
created to keep the smaller states in order. Not only is the ad-
justment of disputes between smaller states possible without sanc-
tions, but I venture to suggest that the prestige of the League,
handicapped as it has been by the vindictive treaties which gave it
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birth, would have been and would now he enhanced if the nations
promptly dropped the unworkable and essentially mischievous
articles 10 and 16. True friends of the League appreciate that fact.
Devotion to the ideal of peace by sanctions has been accompanied
by attacks discountenancing the traditional processes and principles
of international law. On the assumption that war had been or would
be exorcised by the new arrangements for enforcing peace, and on
the assumption that the Kellogg Pact had terminated war as an
instrument of national policy, it was argued (1) that war was
now outlawed and that the "war to end war" had been fought;
(2) that hence neutrality was also a matter of history only, and that
forsooth, should war nevertheless break out, war now being a matter
of concern to the entire world, neutrality was "immoral," for the
states would find the guilty nation and would by sanctions dissuade
it from its illegal ways; and (3) that if war broke out, the rules
governing its conduct, including the rights of neutrals, if such there
were, would not be observed in any event. This ideology was pro-
moted by professed pacifists. Its total disregard of the facts of
life, its essential unworkability, its promise of the enlargement of
armies and navies, and the encouragement of force which it implies,
make its assumptions and consequences a powerful contribution to
anarchy. Not only has this ideology no moorings in experience-
obvious as it is to the hard-earned lessons of humanity's struggle
for a semblance of order-but it actually encourages lawlessness,
and by so doing, inevitably promotes a reliance on force. Perhaps
the first requirement of a scientist is to observe facts accurately;
to shut one's eyes to facts and argue from chimerical assumptions
is not a mark of intelligence. Moral convictions dissociated from
facts may be praiseworthy, but to preach them as political injunc-
tions to a distracted world can lead only to disappointment and
possible destruction. Yet these assumptions have actuated the
theology of the more vocal professional "peace" movement since
1919, most especially in the United States; it was to this unfortu-
nate "thinking" that John Bassett Moore addressed his two frontal
attacks in "An Appeal to Reason"' and in "The New Isolation,"2
a criticism of the propensity of so many votaries of international
law to let their passion for uplift outrun their appreciation of what
was going on in the world. When lawyers turn preachers they
1 Foreign Affairs 547 (July, 1933).
"27 Am. J. Int. L. 607 (Oct., 1933).
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rarely solve any problem, and it perhaps tends to disqualify the
value of their advice.
War has not been exorcised. It has been a common phenomenon
from the day the Treaty of Versailles was signed. The Turco-Greek,
Russo-Polish, Chinese-Japanese, and Paraguay-Bolivian wars are
only the more prominent demonstrations of the unreality of the
assumption. Yet while it is true that the laws of war have been
neglected by learned societies, and that some governments have
exhibited a certain unwillingness to discuss them, this is due to
some extent to the fact that they do not wish to permit certain
recent practices to be brought up for, discussion. It would be hard,
for example, to justify on legal grounds the British Orders-in-
Council of the late war which strangled the trade even between
neutral and neutral without blockade, which abolished the category
of goods conditionally contraband, which undertook to bar all trade
between neutrals and the enemy by legislative restrictions in con-
flict with international law, and which extended contraband lists
to include almost anything usable by a human being. In the days
when the United States was just beginning its career, Washington
and Jefferson had sufficient capacity to prevent such gross viola-
tions of the rights of neutrals; yet in 1916 the United States was
apparently not able or willing to prevent them. History will ask
the explanation. The cause of the law has thereby been greatly
weakened, and the cause of force and the chances of future war
greatly strengthened. The Treaty of Versailles is a hard fact and
not a theory. That treaty incorporated provisions to the effect that
the victor is unaccountable for his violations of international law,
but that the vanquished is not only so liable, but liable as a quasi-
insurer for all losses sustained by nationals of the victor states,
whether caused by the vanquished or not. The private property
of nationals of the vanquished countries was confiscated by article
297 of the Treaty of Versailles, a principle which makes foreign
investments extremely insecure.3 These violations of fundamental
principles are derogatory to law as an institution, and should be
combated by those interested in the development of an ordered
international life. Many of the violations occurred not during the
war, but in the treaty of peace, as an expression of deliberate and
often ill-advised force. Thus, self-restraint, which is the distin-
3 See Bitter and Zelle, No More War on Foreign Investments (Philadelphia,
1933).
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guishing mark of civilized man, was thrown aside and precedents
created which may plague the human family for many a day. But
it is the part of the defenders of civilization to struggle for law
and not to weaken the law by extolling force or supporting policies
which make resort to force inevitable. The latter road can lead only
to one end; the former may retain the hard-won victories of reason
over violence.
But in spite of the repugnance to consideration or reconsideration
of the laws of war, the nations have not been entirely oblivious to
them. Delegates of the principal Powers assembled at The Hague in
1922 to draft a code of law on the use of aircraft and radio in time
of war, and numerous recent bilateral and multilateral treaties,
including those concluded at Havana in 1928, reflect the realization
that war may break out and that, if it does, it must be regulated
so as to prevent reckless destruction and preserve the possibility of
restoring a sane peace and resuming civilized life. That has al-
ways been one of the main purposes of the laws of war, so that
those who manifest congenital indisposition to consider them and
who believe either that it is impossible to control the conduct of
belligerents or that it is best not to seek to do so are contributing
to the intensification of the horrors of war and to the impossibility
of resuming civilized life after the war is over. Possibly they were
too greatly impressed by the belief that all wars are world wars,
or that all countries are likely to be involved, or that belligerents
will always violate the law. There is very little justification for
such belief. Heretofore it has been regarded as a service to limit
by rule the devastating effects of the scourge of war by restraining
the belligerents and holding them to that established compromise
between neutral and belligerent claims which constitutes the laws
of war. Centuries of tradition, the possibility of reprisal, the arous-
ing of hostile public opinion, and their own claims when neutral
have served to restrain belligerents; but if it is suggested that there
are no rules of war, that expediency alone determines the limits
of recklessness, then even these safeguards for restraint and the re-
sumption of peaceful ways are decisively weakened. In no earlier
period of which I am aware has there been a suggestion that by
weakening the law, order or civilization was promoted. The fact
that such ideas now prevail is symbolic of the disorganization of
modern society and arouses fears of its incapacity to preserve itself.
The suggestion that neutrality is undesirable or immoral is even
more subversive of an ordered future for mankind. Since 1919 it
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has been suggested that the system of collective sanctions made neu-
trality impossible; perhaps the final breakdown of the notion of col-
lective sanctions-for it never was a system-will convince the abo-
litionists that neutrality is still within the realm of possibility. That
it is more than a possibility, but an actual fact, is demonstrated by
the wars above mentioned and by the fact that other Powers refused
to become entangled and maintained neutrality. But the suggestion
that it is not desirable may again be regarded as symbolic of the false
thinking that marks the proposal for-collective sanctions. To abolish
neutrality would mean that every people must become a party to
wars or abandon their trade or risk becoming involved at the pleasure
of a belligerent. Heretofore it had always been thought that neu-
trality was a service to peace and sanity, that the smaller the con-
flict, if it had to come, the sooner it was likely to be ended, the less
devastating its effects, and the better the chances for a reasonable
and enduring peace. As John Bassett Moore has remarked, hereto-
fore war-mongers had been the only ones opposed to neutrality; now,
mirabile dictu, pacifists are opposed to it. And in the devotion to
the assumption that wars are caused by evil aggression on one side
and gentle passivity on the other, the suggestion, discarded for nearly
two centuries, is now revived that partiality toward the "good" bel-
ligerent shall mark the neutrality of the future, although that in-
volves the partial nation in war or the risk of war. The suggestion
that neutrality is a thing of the past finds its source in a statement
of Woodrow Wilson, made after the British Government had declined
to accept the principle of the freedom of the seas, the second of the
Fourteen Points, to establish which was the ostensible ground of
American intervention in the European War. When he was informed
that the rejection of the freedom of the seas was not so serious a
matter because hereafter there would be only collective wars and
that in such a war all the members of the League would be engaged,
he rationalized the unenviable position by announcing that after all
neutrality was a thing of the past and presumably that the freedom
of the seas, a time-honored claim of the neutrals, had gone down
with it. The assumption that neutrality is a thing of the past is not
only without foundation, but its abandonment would leave the world
in a precarious condition. John Bassett Moore has said: "No matter
how it is viewed, the demand that the law of neutrality shall be con-
sidered as obsolete is so visionary, so confused, so somnambulistic
that no concession to it can be rationally made."
The suggestion that neutrality is undesirable promotes the cause
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of belligerency and makes the return to reason more difficult. But
American intervention in the late war, followed by a disparagement
of neutrality and the refusal of certain Powers to admit the principle
of the freedom of the seas, is undoubtedly a source of danger for the
future. Struggles for law that had been won may have to be fought
again and the gains of a century may have been sacrificed to Mars.
Intellectual support for such a reversion to naked force can be re-
garded as little less than tragic. The price that may have to be paid
for this mistaken ideology may be high.
The unworkability of the recent schemes for enforcing peace finds
its demonstration not only in resignations from the League and its
possible extinction, which for many reasons would be extremely un-
fortunate, but in the fact that the entire world is conjecturing the
possibilities of another great war in Europe or in Asia. The mere
fact that fifteen years after one of the most destructive of all wars,
from which the world would in any event require decades to recover,
mankind should now be profoundly concerned over the outbreak
of a new war, is of itself an indictment of the theories of enforcing
peace prevalent since 1919. A League of unequals could hardly last.
The attempt to enforce peace caused the collapse of earlier leagues.
The chance of this League's survival depends on early elimination
of its useless and dangerous clauses and the restoration of political
peace in Europe by reconciliation and appeasement. There is no
other road to peace. The refusal to take it has brought the world
to its present pass. But if Europe should risk the consequences of
another war, and embark upon it, its results on the social and eco-
nomic order would be incalculable. The United States, at least, should
endeavor to retain its sanity and its nationhood by refusing to enlist
in the fratricidal strife. Hardly any goal now apparent could justify
the risks to American welfare which belligerency would entail. It
therefore becomes necessary to consider what practical steps the
United States should take, and preferably in time of peace, to insure
its n'eutrality. This can best be accomplished by strengthening its
neutrality laws and, if possible, by coming to an arrangement with
European maritime Powers for the restatement of the laws of mari-
time warfare. In the matter of American legislation, it would be
desirable, in addition to the existing neutrality statutes, to authorize
the President to embargo the shipment of arms and munitions (to
be defined) to both or all the belligerents, and not merely to one
or some of them, as contemplated by the ill-conceived embargo reso-
lution of the spring of 1933, which was actuated by the theory of
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enforcing sanctions against an "aggressor"; to prohibit the float-
ing of public loans in the United States on behalf of either belliger-
ent; to prohibit the enlistment of American citizens in foreign armies,
not only in the United States, as the law now provides, but also
abroad; possibly to prohibit foreign or native representatives of the
belligerent Powers in the United States from making public appeals
for support; to prohibit the entrance into the United States of armed
merchant ships or prizes of war; to prohibit the supply of coal or
other equipment from American ports to warships at sea; to pro-
hibit to American citizens, and possibly to American cargoes, if the
President deem it necessary, carriage on belligerent merchant vessels.
With foreign nations the effort should be made, as a condition
of the debt settlement or otherwise, to restate the law of maritime
warfare, as was done by the Declaration of London, or else to con-
elude bilateral treaties, as was done in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Every effort should be made to limit contraband lists,
as was done in earlier treaties. It is not so necessary, although
desirable, to conclude agreements on blockade or continuous voyage,
because existing international law, in spite of the violations of the
late war, can be invoked. Visit and search should be redefined. It is
not impossible to permit joint certification of cargoes by belligerent
and neutral representatives in neutral ports. Unless trade with.
belligerents, and possibly even trade between neutrals, is to cease
or to lead to serious irritation, the new understanding on the law
should be arrived at. In this connection, Great Britain is the prin-
cipal Power seeking to avoid commitments on the observance of law,
4
and that fact has had much to do with the growth of navies, especi-
ally submarines. It seems hardly likely that weaker Powers will
abandon the physically effective submarine unless Great Britain
will agree to conform to international law. It does not seem possible
that Great Britain will always be a belligerent. There are many fac-
tors involved in Great Britain's position as an island which might
well persuade that country to remain neutral and return to a con-
ventional position approximating that of the Declaration of London.
The Permanent Court of International Justice, should the United
States adhere to the statute, might well be designated as a Prize
Court of Appeal. But in any event, the United States, while de-
fending its right to trade in legitimate commerce, must avoid en-
tanglement in another European war if its future is to be assured.
4 See art. 3 of the Executive Agreement of May 19, 1927.
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The destructiveness and hence possible shortness of another war in
Europe might well aid the policy of neutrality. What the effect of
war in Asia might be, it is not possible to forecast; but that any good
can come from American intervention seems equally unlikely. The
United States can become as bogged in Asia as it now is in Europe,
but that can hardly promote either American, Asian, or European
welfare. A return to the traditional principles on which this country
was founded, after the demonstration of what departure has in-
volved, would be a boon to the United States and to the world at
large. The position has, however, been made more difficult for every
nation concerned by the unfortunate type of "so-called peace" treaty,
to use President Roosevelt's term, concluded at Versailles and by
the unfounded idealization of the supposed "peace machinery"
there brought into being. The disparagement of international law
consequent thereon has weakened the fabric of international rela-
tions and has contributed to that accentuated nationalism which pro-
motes hostility and conflict. The support of revolutionary projects,
to which the harsh facts have refused to yield, has weakened the tra-
ditional law, now more badly needed than ever. The panaceas have
failed and have left us with a weakened constitution and a weakened
legal resistance to force. It was but little service to peace to try to
disavow the law in the name of the new dispensation. It is time
to escape from the psychosis of unreality and to take up again the
thread of law which connected the past with the present and will
connect the present with the future. There are no short cuts to
keep in order so motley a world as this. It was once the opportunity
of the United States to serve itself and the world by promoting the
doctrines of neutrality, non-intervention, arbitration, mediation, and
the recognition of governments in fact. These conservative doctrines
helped to bring to the nineteenth century one of the greatest periods
of prosperity the world has known. Radicalism in international
relations, especially when unfortified by experience, brings its own
reward. It is now with us. Let us return to the time-tested respect
for the law which has at least brought us occasional peace and per
mitted some advancement in human affairs.
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